<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Web on Liniom</title><link>https://422fce27.blog-8x6.pages.dev/tags/web/</link><description>Recent content in Web on Liniom</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 11:19:40 +0200</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://422fce27.blog-8x6.pages.dev/tags/web/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Identity Crisis: When Email Pretends to Be a Primary Key</title><link>https://422fce27.blog-8x6.pages.dev/posts/identity-crisis/</link><pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 11:19:40 +0200</pubDate><guid>https://422fce27.blog-8x6.pages.dev/posts/identity-crisis/</guid><description>&lt;div class="paragraph"&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Most SSO bugs are easy to spot once you look. The app skips signature validation, accepts the wrong issuer, forgets &lt;code&gt;state&lt;/code&gt;, or leaves an open redirect in the callback.&lt;br/&gt;
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nOAuth is harder to see. Every check on the token can pass and &lt;code&gt;email_verified&lt;/code&gt; can be true, yet the app still logs the attacker into someone else’s account, because it uses the email address to decide which account to open.&lt;/p&gt;
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